Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

Osgoode Digital Commons
Articles & Book Chapters

Faculty Scholarship

2009

Keeping Ethical Investment Ethical: Regulatory Issues for
Investing for Sustainability
Benjamin J. Richardson
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

Source Publication:
Journal of Business Ethics. Volume 87, Issue 4 (2009), p. 555-572.

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Environmental Law Commons

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative
Works 4.0 License.
Recommended Citation
Richardson, Benjamin J. "Keeping Ethical Investment Ethical: Regulatory Issues for Investing for
Sustainability." Journal of Business Ethics 87.4 (2009): 555-572.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Articles & Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital
Commons.

Keeping Ethical Investment Ethical:
Regulatory Issues for Investing
for Sustainability

Benjamin J. Richardson

ABSTRACT. Regulation must target the financial sector, which often funds and profits from environmentally
unsustainable development. In an era of global financial markets, the financial sector has a crucial impact on the state
of the environment. The long-standing movement for ethically and socially responsible investment (SRI) has
recently begun to advocate environmental standards for financiers. While this movement is gaining more adherents, it
has increasingly justified responsible financing as a path to be prosperous, rather than virtuous. This trend partly owes to
how financial institutions view their legal responsibilities. The business case motivations that now predominantly drive
SRI are not sufficient to make the financial sector a means to sustainable development. Some modest legal reforms
to improve the quality and extent of SRI have yet to make a tangible difference. A more ambitious strategy to
promote SRI for environmental sustainability is possible, based on reforming the fiduciary duties of financial
institutions. Such duties, tied to concrete performance standards, could make financiers invest in more ethically
responsible ways. Other collateral reforms to financial markets, including improved corporate environmental
reporting, are required to promote sustainability.

KEY WORDS: financial markets, ethical investment, socially responsible investment, sustainable development,
environmental law

The SRI agenda and its environmental challenges

Ethical investment, or socially responsible investment (SRI) as this financing movement is more
commonly known today, increasingly downplays ethics. Traditionally, it championed an explicit

ethical agenda, notably associated with the antislavery campaigns of the Quakers in the 1700s and, in the
1970s, the divestment boycott against South Africa’s apartheid regime. These investors addressed social or
environmental concerns not for any financial reward, but for the moral desire and responsibility to
improve the world. The renaissance of SRI in the mainstream financial markets since the late 1990s has
problematically disavowed this ethical posture. Responsible investors increasingly pitch their case for
taking social or environmental issues into account on business grounds, on the assumption that SRI will
make them prosperous, rather than merely virtuous. They tend to heed such issues only when they are
perceived to be ‘‘financially material’’ in other words, when they pose tangible financial risks or lucrative
investment opportunities. While business case SRI is becoming popular, it risks perpetuating business-asusual and reducing the SRI movement’s capacity to leverage lasting change for environmental
sustainability. Environmental problems have become the most important SRI cause today, yet it is
doubtful whether present forms of SRI will make a significant difference to their resolution.
Ethical investment to promote sustainability should no longer be a discretionary option for
financiers, to follow only if there is a compelling business case. In a world facing grave ecological
problems, the financial sector must shoulder some of the responsibility to shift economic activity towards
sustainable development. This is not an argument to conscript private capital for public purposes. Rather,
ethical investment for sustainability proceeds from the assumption that private investment has public costs
to the environment that must be accounted for. Sustainability, as the crucial policy goal, entails the viability
of natural systems, such as the global climate, and societal and economic issues that may impinge upon
environmental management, such as public health and poverty (Daly, 1997). The financial sector,
incorporating banks, pension plans and other types of financiers that facilitate development by distributing
capital and managing financial risks, exerts massive economic influence. For instance, the recent collapse of
the sub-prime mortgage market in the United States has reverberated worldwide beyond the banking

sector. The financial markets are also where ‘‘wholesale’’ decisions concerning future development, and
thus eventual environmental pressures, arise. These pressures, once warned the United Nations’
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Board (2005, p. 5), are ‘‘putting such strain on the natural functions of
the Earth that the ability of the planet’s ecosystems to sustain future generations can no longer be taken for
granted’’. Environmental degradation requires some radical changes to the accountability of economic
institutions including the financial sector.
Accepting the inevitability of ecological limits to economic growth will entail redefining societal
measurements of value and success. While business case SRI like any investment choice can be viewed as a
manifestation of some basic ethical position, such as utilitarianism, it does not reflect credible ethical standards
to safeguard ecological systems over the long term. Many environmentalists contend that only through a
new ethical paradigm can humanity evolve sustainably, living in harmony with nature (Devall and
Sessions, 2001). In 1992, some 1700 international scientists proclaimed their ‘‘Warning to Humanity’’,
cautioning that ‘‘[h]uman beings and the natural world are on a collision course’’ (Union of Concerned
Scientists, 1992). To avert a catastrophe, they called for ‘‘[a] new ethic … a new attitude towards
discharging our responsibility for caring for ourselves and for the earth’’. Many others now agree that
progress towards sustainability depends upon challenging the anthropocentric and instrumental values of
industrialised, capitalist society (Soskolne, 2007). Any other solution would likely just respond to the
symptoms rather than the root causes of unsustainable development. An ethical view helps decisionmakers to understand and improve human behaviour, providing additional grounds to act when, for
instance, the financial incentives are deficient. Yet, lofty rhetoric for more enlightened behaviour on its own
will be unlikely to inspire change voluntarily. Nor will market forces engender changes except within the
framework of the business case. Because business entities are not natural persons, they require formal rules
and procedures to help inculcate ethical behaviour.

This article explores the limitations of business case SRI and considers how the legal system can
restore an ethical basis to ethical investment for furthering environmental sustainability. Among
possible reforms, it is argued that redefining the fiduciary duties of investment institutions is most
crucial. Certainly, there will always be some room for individuals to choose lawful investments
according to their own moral scruples. Yet, as financial institutions invest on behalf of millions and
wield enormous economic influence, they must be seen as endowed with public responsibilities and be
governed by standards that protect natural systems for the long term. Fiduciary duties, which govern how
financial decision-makers should manage the assets of investors, presently are framed in a way that may
accommodate business case SRI. But they hardly license ethical investment.

SRI’s morph to the business case

The SRI movement is seeking greater accountability of the financial sector for the environmental problems
connected to the economic activities it funds (Jeucken, 2001; Labatt and White, 2002). Investors have
traditionally been remote to the environmental sequelae of their financing decisions (Thomas, 2001). Causal
relationships between finance and its environmental impacts are dispersed widely across time and space,
often obscuring investors’ responsibility for the degradation. In a sense, financial institutions are the unseen
polluters (Richardson, 2008), contributing in obscured ways to environmental troubles which they sponsor
and profit from. Having long outgrown its origins of religious-based, ad hoc causes, contemporary SRI is
starting to address the financial sector’s role in unsustainable development. Yet, SRI actors’ motivations for
improving the environmental performance of the financial sector increasingly are generally not ethically
driven.

Business case SRI – the principal form of SRI – scrutinises social, environmental and corporate
governance issues in terms of their effect on the financial performance of investments. These issues
acquire significance primarily to the extent that they are perceivable as financially ‘‘material’’ to an
investment portfolio (UNEPFI, 2004b). The tools of business case SRI include light-touch investment
screens filtering out only the most insidious firms (so as not to significantly diminish portfolio
diversification and thus returns), polite engagement with corporate management and more nuanced
evaluations of the financial consequences associated with corporations’ social and environmental
activities. This approach has been endorsed by leading international SRI networks. Catering mainly to
the institutional investment sector, the United Nations Environment Program Finance Initiative (UNEPFI,
2006, p. 4) explains in its report, Show Me the Money, that: ‘‘[t]he first – and arguably for investors the most
important – reason to integrate [SRI] issues is, simply, to make more money…’’. In another
UNEPFI report (2004a, p. 5), financial analysts are advised to demonstrate ‘‘material links to business
value; … [and] avoid moral arguments’’. In the retail market, such as among mutual funds, SRI is also
awash with business case rhetoric, with funds marketed for how they can help investors to reap higher
returns and outperform the market (Brill et al., 1999).
Alternatively, some investors, particularly in the religious sector, see SRI as principally a matter of
ethical necessity. From the framework of teleological ethics, they may treat SRI as a means to change the
criteria of capital allocation and motivate firms to improve their environmental and social behaviour. This
contrasts to the traditional and increasingly rarer deontological type of ethical investment, involving investors
who personally do not wish to profit from unethical activities (e.g. gambling or pornography), rather than
placing a priority on changing the behaviour of others. Either way, investors are expected to act
ethically without being constrained by profit motives. The ethical case, however, does not ignore the
bottom line, as investors of any persuasion are not charities. Yet, it diverges from business case justifications

for SRI by prioritising ethical issues for their own sake. They may accept lower financial returns in order to
defend ethical values.
Ethical investment was pioneered by religious institutions (Triolo et al., 2000, pp. 26–53). They
campaigned for social and environmental concerns not for any financial advantage but for the moral
imperative to improve the world. The churches spearheaded a divestment campaign against companies
profiting from apartheid in South Africa, contributing to its eventual demise. Some faith-based
institutions continue to be the vanguard of change, such as the Interfaith Center for Corporate
Responsibility’s campaigns concerning climate change and environmental justice.1 Ethically motivated
investors are also found to some extent in the credit union sector, such as Canada’s VanCity credit union; in
the banking sector, notably the Umweltbank (Germany) and in some mutual funds that offer dedicated
ethically screened portfolios, as Domini Social Investments (United States). The ethical approach is
expressed even more strongly in some of the SRI governance standards advocated by civil society groups,
such as the 2003 Collevecchio Declaration on Financial Institutions.2
Unless considered financially tangible, the social and environmental issues championed by ethical
investment may be overlooked by business case investors. Often they perceive such issues as too
nebulous for workable financial quantification (McGeachie et al., 2005, p. 57). Sometimes ‘‘reputational
risks’’ associated with unethical environmental or social practices may trigger action. Given that
somewhere between 50% and 70% of large public companies’ value is considered intangible,
including brand name and goodwill, risk to their reputation may induce more ethical behaviour.3 A
pioneering report commissioned by the World Resources Institute (Herz et al., 2007) argues that the
poor and marginalised can benefit from the business case approach where financiers find that their
projects need community consent and legitimacy. Nonetheless, reputational risk to financiers is not an

echo for all underlying societal concerns, as sometimes the most disadvantaged groups and victims of
environmental hardship lack the means to publicise their plight. And, some financiers or firms of low
public visibility may not be particularly vulnerable to such reputational risks in the first place.
The economy-wide portfolios of large institutional investors provide another potential basis for
business case SRI. Hawley and Williams (2000) proclaim ‘‘universal investors’’ such as large pension
funds as a growing force for corporate responsibility, as their broad stock portfolios should make them
interested in the health and long-term sustainability of the entire economy. In contrast, an investor in just
one company or one economic sector is not as broadly focused, and presumably therefore will care only
about the financial performance of that narrow interest and not necessarily on the costs it may impose on
others. It would be optimistic however to imply that such institutional investors can coordinate their
investments to keep economic growth within biosphere limits. The market contains no mechanism to scale
the economy within the carrying capacity of the planet (Daly, 1992). In the absence of regulatory restraints,
such as a cap on the economy’s carbon emissions, universal investors are unlikely to cooperate readily to
moderate economic growth imperatives. Further, institutional investors commonly act through
intermediaries – fund managers – whose reward system and short-term investment mandates encourage
narrow and myopic investment decision making (Golding, 2002).
Such factors probably help to explain why the SRI market remains small. It likely holds below 10% or
more likely 5% of the capital markets of major economies. In the United States market, the Social
Investment Forum (SIF) reported that in 2007 (SIF, 2008, p. ii) that US $2.71 trillion or ‘‘one out of every
nine dollars under professional management in the United States today is involved in socially
responsible investing’’. The European Social Investment Forum (Eurosif) reported in its 2006 survey
that SRI in Western Europe was worth between e105 billion (based on core SRI screens) and e1033
trillion (incorporating further the value of shareholder activism and engagement). The latter, larger figure

was the equivalent of between 10% and 15% of managed assets in European funds.
Even these modest numbers strain credibility, as much finance masquerading as SRI likely hardly
contributes to sustainable development. The United States study relied on very broad standards for measuring
the SRI universe, counting the entire portfolio of funds that screen merely against one issue, such as tobacco,
alcohol or gambling. Indeed, 25% of nominal SRI funds screened only on the basis of one of these criteria.
The Eurosif research tallied the value of shareholder engagement and proxy voting practices, yet there is no
extensive research on the actual extent and quality of such practices. Because the SRI market is likely to be
much smaller than these surveys suggest, its capacity to leverage change by raising the financing costs of
polluters or pressuring for change through shareholder activism is probably rather limited (Angel and Rivoli,
1997; Gillan and Starks, 1998).

SRI legal reforms

The relationship between SRI and the legal system has generally not been adequately scrutinised by
policy-makers or commentators (Richardson, 2008). Certainly, in the broader corporate social responsibility
(CSR) debate, there is widespread wrangling over the extent to which corporations can be motivated to
act responsibly without the necessity of regulatory compulsion. In a recent contribution to that debate,
Reich in his best-seller Supercapitalism (2007) dismisses the possibilities of CSR and calls for the strengthening
of democratic processes and public regulation to control corporate excesses. On the other hand, Davis et
al. (2006) exude confidence in the capacity of the mass investor society to forge positive change through
their pension funds and other investment intermediaries. Indeed, historically, one of the forces behind the
growth of SRI has been faith in its ability to provide a form of surrogate market regulation. In the

absence of appropriate official regulation, investors hope to leverage change through market pressure. For
example, the divestment campaign against South African-based companies was motivated by the failure of
governments to act. Yet, as will be argued here, SRI does not stand apart from the legal system. The
prevalence of business case SRI not only reflects the pressure of economic fundamentals in a competitive
market, it also owes to the legal arrangements governing financial institutions. Conversely, to stimulate
ethical investment will likely require the state to alter the incentives and obligations to undertake SRI.
Legal reforms in some countries to promote SRI have generally yet to transform the status quo, which
assumes that the market is efficient and functions best with minimal governmental oversight.
Traditionally, authorities have connected ecological and social problems only to those companies that
most visibly consume and pollute nature. The SRI reforms to counter that perception have been
adopted at both national and international levels, although in the latter they tend to be only voluntary,
aspirational standards (Richardson, 2007a). Congruent with trends in governance worldwide away from
‘‘command-and-control’’ regulation, SRI policy reforms have tended to emphasise market-based and
informational standards that leave financiers with significant discretion over investment decisions.
Thus, SRI regulation commonly involves process standards including mechanisms for financiers to
report their SRI policies, proxy voting activities and environmental impacts of financial significance. Such
process standards enable the assessment, verification and communication of performance, and in theory
thereby can put pressure on environmental laggards to change or reward leaders through competitive
market advantages. In the UK and several other European states, and Australia, occupational pension funds
must disclose any policies they adopt for SRI.4 In Canada and the United States, mutual funds are required
to disclose their proxy voting policies and voting records.5 Voluntary standards have also been
developed in the SRI sector, including the Global Reporting Initiative6 and the Carbon Disclosure

Project.7 Under such transparency regulation, financiers may choose not to invest ethically, so long as they
disclose that decision. In practice, their mandated disclosures often entail vague, perfunctory statements that
reveal little about the methodology behind SRI decisions or their implementation (Fair Pensions,
2006). SRI funds seldom demonstrate the level of transparency and participation they demand of the
corporations that make up their portfolios. External consultants and fund managers often enjoy much
more influence than fund members in setting SRI policies.
Normative standards, providing substantive principles for investment practices, constitute another less
common style of SRI governance. In some jurisdictions, national pension funds are obliged to invest
responsibly and ethically. These measures have been adopted in France, New Zealand, Norway and
Sweden. For example, Sweden’s National Pension Insurance Funds (AP-Funds) Act of 2000 requires state
pension funds to take ‘‘environmental and social considerations … into account without relinquishing
the overall goal of a high return on capital’’.8 An ethics council guides the Swedish pension funds in
discerning ethical investment choices. The UNEPFI’s (2007, p. 7) recent survey of these and other
public

sector funds ‘‘highlight[ed] a range of some of the most advanced and creative approaches to

responsible investment’’. Occasionally, states have sought to actually ban certain investments, such as
Belgium’s prohibition on the financing of companies that produce, distribute or in other ways are
connected to cluster bombs (Netwerk Vlaanderen, 2007).
Among voluntary normative regimes, the UN Principles of Responsible Investment (UNPRI) of 2006
has acquired great attention in the SRI community. It contains six core principles, each of which is
illustrated by several ‘‘possible actions’’.9 The Principles are heavily subscribed but likely primarily
because of their voluntary nature and the lack of radical changes expected of signatories. The UNPRI
does not require a signatory to demonstrate any particular performance grade with regard to human

rights or environmental protection. The Principles also lack compliance machinery, and signatories are
presently not obliged to report publicly on their compliance. The Equator Principles, which address
project financing, prescribe more detailed sustainable development standards based on the International
Finance Corporation’s policies.10 They contain more credible public reporting and consultation
standards, although evidence that some banks continue to sponsor environmentally degrading projects
suggests that implementation of the Principles is uneven (Hardenbrook, 2007).
Governments have introduced some other policy instruments to stimulate SRI, including green
investment tax concessions (e.g. in the Netherlands), corporate governance reforms to facilitate
shareholder advocacy (e.g. in Australia and Canada) and environmental liability on lenders (e.g. in the
United States) (Richardson, 2008, pp. 281–378). Few developing countries have introduced policy
measures to stimulate SRI. The effectiveness of these mechanisms is patchy. In a neo-liberal policy climate
where the market is widely seen as the most effective means of promoting social welfare, no jurisdiction has
sought to intensify SRI regulation.
In general, the progression of the SRI market, and its governance, remains muted. A vast legal terrain of
potential reform remains underexplored. Reliance on existing environmental regulatory controls that
target the ‘‘front-line’’ businesses, such as mining and manufacturing firms, is insufficient for many
reasons. Targeting the financial sector through SRI reforms could reduce the burden on presently often
ineffectual front-line regulatory controls, as companies passing the rigours of SRI standards should be easier
to regulate at an operational level. Financiers’ strategic economic position can also be exploited by policymakers to overcome traditional obstacles to such regulation. Systems theory explains how the
differentiation of modern society into semi-autonomous subsystems, such as the market and the legal
spheres, has made it difficult for regulation to control corporations whose behaviour is accustomed to the
market’s norms of money, exchange, competition and profitability (Luhmann, 1995). The financial

sector, while part of the market system, also occupies a strategic position often closely tied to government
policy-making (e.g. as a means to implement official monetary policy on interest rates or money
laundering controls). Financial institutions could also be harnessed as a means of environmental regulation,
such as through requirements to promote SRI (Richardson, 2002). Above all, in a global economy shaped
increasingly by cross-border investment, regulatory controls at the point of where capital is raised are
crucial. Global finance, which enables financiers to invest in foreign markets with weak human rights
and environmental standards, must be countered by sustainability standards embedded into financial markets.

Ethics for investing for sustainability

In a milieu where SRI is largely a matter of voluntary choice rather than regulatory compulsion, a
diversity of approaches to SRI has flourished. This diversity reflects investors’ different values regarding the
relative importance of social, environmental and economic considerations (Mackenzie, 1998; Sparkes, 2001).
Hylton (1992, p. 2) criticises the ‘‘persistent inability on the part of all participants in the debate to develop
a simple, coherent definition’’ of SRI. Generally, the only common ingredient is a business case motivation
to invest responsibly. Ethical concepts such as ‘‘sustainable development’’ or ‘‘corporate responsibility’’ are
prone to being dismissed as merely subjective and personal values. Thus, when the Irish Parliament in 2006
rejected a legislative amendment to require the National Pensions Reserve Fund to invest ethically, one
parliamentarian reasoned: ‘‘[a] major difficulty in deciding on ethical investment policy is where to draw the
line in defining the parameters of the policy, given that there will inevitably be different opinions and
intense debate on what constitutes ethical and socially responsible investment’’ (Parliament of Ireland,
2006, p. 5).

Alternatively, investors can hardly set their moral compass only by the law of the land. Merely because an
economic activity is ostensibly ‘‘legal’’ does not mean it is appropriate for ethical investment. The tobacco
industry is a clear example. Legal rules may simply reflect the power of vested interests or fail to meet basic
international human rights and environmental standards. Given that one of the traditional purposes of SRI
has been to advance change, to push corporations beyond current legal standards, it would seem
counterproductive to fall back on the latter as the benchmark to follow.
Unavoidably, SRI needs a stronger ethical foundation to contribute more thoroughly to sustainability.
Ownership, competition and material gain are characteristics of the financial world which reduce
nature to an expedient resource for shortterm gain. They reflect a wider anthropocentric worldview
in most cultures that restrict moral significance to human beings (White, 1967). In a statement on
unsustainable patterns of resource use, the UN Economic and Social Council (2002, p. 5) explained:
‘‘[t]he value systems reflected in these patterns are among the main driving forces which determine the
use of natural resources. Although the changes required for converting societies to sustainable
consumption and production patterns are not easy to implement, the shift is imperative’’.
Underpinning SRI with an ethic that takes into account the importance of safeguarding ecological
integrity would provide the platform for SRI to contribute to sustainability policy goals more
comprehensively.
Beyond the financial sector, a vibrant discourse on ecological ethics has matured. It focuses on broadening
moral consideration for all animals and plants and their constituent ecosystems (Light and Rolston, 2003;
Schmidtz and Willott, 2002; Stone, 1987; Taylor, 1998). It is shaped by recognition of humankind’s
dependence on nature’s life sustaining properties (Capra, 1996). However, rejecting the anthropocentric
traditions of environmental resource management, this approach also affirms the sanctity of all species for their
‘‘intrinsic value’’, regardless of any perceived instrumental worth to human welfare. While this outlook

does not deny human beings’ entitlement to use other forms of life, given that we are ‘‘participants in the
evolutionary process’’ (Engel, 2005, p. 62), it provides humankind with a framework to think beyond its own
interests. The environmental practices of indigenous communities to some extent reflect such values
(Durning, 1992).
It is very unlikely, however, that moral exhortations alone will alter financiers’ behaviour. Such ethical
prescriptions must be articulated and protected legally as formal standards and procedures. Various
peremptory principles have been drafted for this purpose. The Earth Charter evokes the kind of universal
principles compatible with ethically framed SRI.11 It was adopted in 2000 following lengthy consultation
mainly held among non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and presently has endorsements some 3000
organisations worldwide. The Charter’s principles most relevant for the business sector state:

6. Prevent harm as the best method of environmental protection and, when knowledge is limited,
apply a precautionary approach.
7. Adopt patterns of production, consumption, and

reproduction

that

safeguard

Earth’s

regenerative capacities, human rights, and community well-being. …
10. Ensure that economic activities and institutions at all levels promote human development in an
equitable and sustainable manner.

Nonetheless, the Earth Charter is a general statement of principles not tailored for the financial sector. Its
provisions are generally framed too broadly to provide meaningful guidance. Only 180 business
organisations have endorsed the Charter to date.
More directly relevant to SRI is the Collevecchio Declaration on Financial Institutions, drafted in 2003 by a
coalition of NGOs.12 It sets ethical standards specifically for financial markets, based on six core

principles, namely sustainability, ‘‘do no harm’’, responsibility, accountability, transparency, and
sustainable markets and governance. The Declaration’s accompanying implementation guide outlines
immediate steps that financial institutions should take. Yet, apart from the pension fund behemoth, the
California Public Employees’ Retirement System, financiers have largely shunned the Declaration (most of
the some 100 signatories are NGOs). Financiers likely find its standards too radical. For instance, the
Declaration’s ambitious ‘‘commitment to sustainability’’ principle obliges signatories to ‘‘fully integrate the
consideration of ecological limits [and] social equity … into corporate strategies and core business areas
(including credit, investing, underwriting, advising), to put sustainability objectives on an equal footing to
shareholder maximization and client satisfaction …’’. Further, the ‘‘do no harm’’ principle entails
categorical prohibitions for the most socially and environmentally egregious transactions. The
Declaration also seeks to strengthen financiers’ accountability and transparency, expecting them to be
‘‘responsive to stakeholder needs for specialised information’’ and that ‘‘commercial confidentiality should
not be used as an excuse to deny stakeholders information’’.
The financial sector’s disavowal of such exacting principles suggests that an ethical framework must be
based on more than a voluntary code, although its standards should certainly be formulated with input from
applicable institutions. Ethical investment will have no lasting impression on the financial sector if investors
regard it simply as regulatory prescription. Rather than relaying on regulatory commands based on a rigid
laundry list of allowable investments, ethical standards could be incorporated into financial decision
making by redefining the fiduciary duties of investment institutions. Indeed, as fiduciary duties set the
overarching investment norms, they should be central to legal reforms for SRI.

Legal reforms for ethical investment

Fiduciary duties

Financial institutions manage the capital of investors, such as the members of a pension fund, contributors to a
mutual fund or shareholders of a bank. Longestablished legal principles govern the relationships between
fund managers and investors. While individuals may invest directly in the market, in recent decades most
rely on a financial intermediary. In Britain, for example, the proportion of all corporate shares held by
individuals fell from 54% in 1963 to below 13% in 2006 (UK, Office for National Statistics, 2007). The
legal system imposes fiduciary standards on financial intermediaries to invest carefully in the interests of
their beneficiaries and in accordance with the purpose of the particular fund. Essentially, a fiduciary
relationship is a bond of responsibility and dependency, where one person exercises some discretionary
power in the interests of another (Shepherd, 1981). This relationship of ‘‘trust’’ is a concept of English
law by which specific assets are held and managed by the trustee (i.e. the fiduciary) in the interests of the
beneficiary (Hudson, 1999). Functionally, similar legal arrangements in financial regulation tend to exist
in civil law jurisdictions. The relationship of trust involves a duty of loyalty, requiring the fiduciary to act in
the beneficiaries’ sole or best interests (Langbein, 2005). The fiduciary also has a duty of competence,
requiring skill and diligence, which is usually expressed in investment management as the ‘‘prudent
investor rule’’ (Longstreth, 1986). Depending on the jurisdiction, the sources of their legal duties come
from the common law, legislation and the specific instruments governing an investment entity (e.g.
a pension plan’s founding agreement). Fiduciary responsibilities however are not uniform across the
financial sector. Occupational pension fund trustees are subject to clear fiduciary duties, while the
directors of commercial banks do not generally owe an equivalent duty to their depositors.

Fiduciary standards were first seen as a potential constraint to SRI in the 1980s, during the South
African divestment campaign (Troyer et al., 1985). Today, the impact of fiduciary duties on a much
wider SRI agenda including environmental issues is debated. The World Economic Forum (2005, p. 10) has
recommended that authorities ‘‘[m]odify pension fiduciary rules which discourage or prohibit explicit trustee
consideration of social and environmental aspects of corporate performance’’. Confidently, a report
commissioned by UNEPFI (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 2005, p. 13) suggested that ‘‘integrating
[SRI] considerations into an investment analysis so as to more reliably predict financial performance is
clearly permissible and is arguably required in all jurisdictions’’. Such an optimistic conclusion
however assumes SRI driven by business case criteria.
Fiduciary standards can constrain SRI to the extent they prioritise unadulterated financial goals.
Conceptually, a ‘‘benefit’’ to beneficiaries need not be limited to financial values. If they share a moral
objection to a particular investment, they may psychologically benefit if their fund avoids it, possibly even
to their financial detriment (Palmer et al., 2005, p. 97). In one United States case, the court viewed
the nature of a fiduciary relationship as requiring the trustees to safeguard ‘‘unique scenic,
paleontological, and archaeological values that would have little economic value on the open
market’’.13 Even where the purpose of the trust is construed as only to provide financial benefits, some
courts have interpreted the duty of loyalty as only to seek a reasonable rate of return rather than to maximise
financial returns. A judge in one British case opined: ‘‘I cannot conceive that trustees have an
unqualified duty … simply to invest trust funds in the most profitable investment available’’.14
Consequently, fiduciaries may further collateral social and environmental goals so long as financial returns
are not unreasonably compromised. Indeed, given evidence that SRI funds do not generally underperform
the market (UNEPFI and Mercer, 2007),15 socially responsible companies can arguably constitute a

prudent financial choice. Some social and environmental risks may ultimately affect shareholder value, such
as through litigation, regulatory actions, consumer backlash and other costly responses (Edwards, 1998;
Mercer, 2005).
The question of whether current fiduciary standards can accommodate SRI also depends on several other
variables, including the methods of SRI. Strict ethical screens that exclude large portions of the market
reduce portfolio diversification and thereby likely diminish risk-adjusted returns (Ellison, 1991). Other SRI
strategies such as best-of-class, selecting the most socially responsible firms in each particular economic
sector, should allow for retention of an adequately diversified portfolio. Further, shareholder advocacy,
whereby investors seek to influence companies from within through shareholder resolutions and
other tactics, should contribute to the fulfilment of fiduciary duties (Myners, 2001, p. 92). Finally, the
applicable legal instrument constituting the fund is often the foremost authority in governing a fiduciary’s
duties and investment decisions.16 This reflects another aspect of the duty of loyalty. If the trust deed of a
pension plan expressly requires social investment to further a specified mission, then the fiduciary must
fulfil those criteria unless legislation dictates otherwise.17
Disputes about the legality of SRI have resulted in several court rulings. In the UK, the fiduciary
responsibilities of trustees were considered in Cowan v. Scargill,18 Martin v. City of Edinburgh District
Council,19 and Harries and others v. Church Commissioners for England.20 In Cowan, Vice-Chancellor Robert
Megarry disagreed with the SRI policy of the union-nominated trustees, holding that where the trust’s
purpose is to provide financial benefits for the beneficiaries, the best interests of the beneficiaries
normally meant only their financial interests.21 Trustees could consider nonfinancial criteria in
constructing such a portfolio, provided such alternate investments were equally beneficial to the
beneficiaries. The most noteworthy United States case on SRI is the Board of Trustees of Employee

Retirement System of the City of Baltimore v. City of Baltimore. It involved public sector pension plans that were
directed under the municipality’s ordinances to divest from companies engaged in business in South
Africa. In a legal challenge, the court cautiously endorsed the SRI policies, ruling that if ‘‘social
investment yields economically competitive returns at a comparable level of risk, the investment should
not be deemed imprudent’’.22
Because SRI is increasingly viewed as a means to prosperity, entailing no financial sacrifice, such legal
precedents pose little hindrance to its advancement. Indeed, the average SRI portfolio sometimes appears little
different to a regular investment fund. A 2004 survey by the Natural Capital Institute concluded that ‘‘the
screening methodologies and exceptions employed by most SRI funds allow practically any publicly held
corporation to be considered as an SRI portfolio company’’ (Hawken, 2004, p. 16). Investment policies
that prioritise ethical goals of course remain problematic, except to some extent in the retail market where
mutual funds can tailor ethical investment products to meet any public demand. Otherwise, fiduciary
investment standards do not require consideration of social and environmental matters.
Fiduciary finance: performance metrics for sustainability

A reformed fiduciary standard to stimulate ethically based SRI will be unworkable if financial institutions are
merely accountable to vague prescriptions such as to ‘‘promote sustainable development’’. Such values
must be expressed in concrete formulae to be meaningful to financiers. Social accounting and
sustainability indicators provide metrics that could help quantify social and environmental performance to
underpin a new fiduciary standard.
Social accounting aims to measure the collateral benefits (e.g. public infrastructure and
environmental protection) and costs (e.g. damage to natural resources) of economic activity (Quarter et al.,
2003; Unerman et al., 2007). Social accountants however have yet to devise means to valuate all social

or environmental impacts. Social accounting differs from conventional methodologies associated with
the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), by focusing on community and environmental
impacts rather than on factors exclusively related to corporate financial health. Nonetheless, years of
research on social accounting has hardly influenced conventional financial accounting (Gray et al., 1996).
The GAAP measures an entity’s expenses and income associated with past, not future, market
transactions. Accounting for the disparate and often ethereal externalities of firms in a financier’s portfolio
would require fundamental changes to this model. So far, social accounting has mostly influenced the
propagation of satellite, narrative reporting schemes, such as the ‘‘management discussion and analysis’’
sections in corporate financial statements.
While social accounting is not a means of perpetuating business case SRI – for it focuses on
pricing social welfare rather than serving corporate business needs – it may not induce better quality SRI.
It implies a cost–benefit paradigm that may not ensure maintenance of ecological integrity, as nature may be
trumped or substituted by seemingly more pressing values. The Ford Pinto case in the 1970s, where
corporate managers used a cost–benefit analysis to conclude that the costs of correcting a defective
fuel system design on one of the company’s cars outweighed the expected litigation costs of deaths
and/or injuries, highlights the dangers of instrumental economic calculations (Birsch and Fielder,
1994). Similar social accounting goals could perhaps be achieved through economic policy instruments
such as environmental taxes charged to polluting companies (which in turn would create costs to be
accounted for in investment decisions). The usefulness of such economic policy instruments depends on the
integrity of the environmental policy goals that they are meant to serve. Social accounting is therefore
probably most suitable as one means to help price the cost of social and environmental behaviour and
facilitate cost-effective solutions, but it itself does not embody sustainability performance standards.
More useful in this respect are sustainability indicators. They allow progress towards sustainability

based on certain social, environmental and other markers to be tracked over time (Bell and Morse, 2008).
They can also assist decision makers by translating ecological, economic and social data into performance
standards, and warning of impending problems. While sustainability indicators can be just as
methodologically complex to determine as social accounting metrics, they do not per se require financial
quantification. And, they do not dictate how underlying performance standards be met. With further
refinement, they even could replace shareholder value as the dominant measure of corporate success.
Sustainability indicators differ from traditional indicators of social, economic and environmental
progresses that measure changes in one domain (e.g. water quality) by seeking to reflect interconnections
among such metrics enabling a more systemic, comprehensive and multidisciplinary perspective. Some
useful proxy indicators of sustainability have been pioneered, the ‘‘eco-footprint’’ concept being the most
promising (Wackernagel and Rees, 1996). New sustainability metrics are being designed for various scales
of economic activity, ranging from the global level down to the local community, company and
project levels (Keeble et al., 2003). A vast research industry has mushroomed to develop corporate
sector sustainability indicators. Ratings of corporate social and environmental performance have become
crucial for the SRI industry, providing the basis for portfolio selections. Yet, their competitive proliferation
and lack of regulatory oversight and coherence have hindered their reliability.
Sustainability indicators for financial institutions’ portfolios as a whole have not been adequately
designed. Efforts by a group of European banks to design a set of environmental indicators specifically at
the financial sector did not extend to the ecological effects associated with financial transactions. Their
report explained that, apart from methodological problems in setting such indicators, ‘‘it is the client’s
primary responsibility to document these changes to the environment…’’ (Schmid-Schö nbein and
Braunschweig, 2000, p. 12). One innovative attempt to quantify one important externality of an entire

investment portfolio is Trucost’s annual ‘‘carbon counts’’ survey, which measures and ranks UK
investment funds according to the carbon intensity of their portfolios (a seminal indicator of
sustainability). Its evaluation of 185 investment funds in 2007 found that 25% of the so-called SRI funds
polluted more than industry benchmarks (Trucost, 2007).
One cannot assume that if individual firms are acceptable enough to form part of a sustainable
portfolio, then the financial institution as a whole is investing sustainably. Mistakenly, this assumption
would not reflect aspects of a financial institution’s management systems relevant for ethical investment, such
as the democratic quality of its decision making. Those decision-making systems are important indicators of
future performance, whereas most sustainability indicators are lagging indicators tracking only historic
impacts. Furthermore, evaluating some environmental impacts at a portfolio level rather than merely
an individual firm level helps to provide a more comprehensive picture, consistent with the universal
investor thesis, such as of business supply chains and product life-cycle impacts.
Concomitantly, we should be mindful that sustainability indicators and social accounting systems will
not reflect all social and environmental aspects of investment. Some issues are too complex for these
methods, at least presently. One example is the evaluation of the social equity in the distribution of the
benefits and burdens of use of the environment. While investment fiduciaries may be able to effectively
respond to discrete social problems, such as divesting from firms that exploit child labour or practice
racially discriminatory hiring, fiduciaries can hardly address pervasive social and economic inequalities
inherent in a capitalist economy.
Together, sustainability indicators and social accounting provide tools for fiduciary duties to
further ethical investment for some aspects of sustainability. The equally significant challenge is how those
duties should be legally framed.

Fiduciary duties for SRI

Fiduciary duties for ethical investment may be redefined along a spectrum of ever-increasing exactitude
(Richardson, 2007b). At the most liberal end of the spectrum, fiduciary duties could merely authorise
fiduciaries to consider those social and environmental factors which they view as financially material.
Arguably, this business case approach is already allowable, indeed essential if environmental risks jeopardise shortterm returns. Such a reform to fiduciary duties would put the matter beyond doubt. Some jurisdictions
already have altered fiduciary standards to give decision-makers more discretion. Connecticut legislation
provides that controllers of the Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds may consider the
environmental and social implications of investments.23 Two Canadian provinces, Manitoba and Ontario,
provide further examples. In 1995, Manitoba’s Trustee Act was amended to permit trustees to consider nonfinancial criteria in their investment policies, so long as ‘‘the trustee exercises the judgment and care that a
person of prudence, discretion and intelligence would exercise in administering the property of others’’.24
In 2005, a similar provision was grafted into Manitoban pension legislation.25
Obviously, the weakness of such a discretionary standard is that it does not oblige consideration of social or
environmental impacts. Nor does it allow affected third parties to enforce their interests. There is a difference
between taking the interests of various parties into account and owing a duty to those parties. The duty of
loyalty that a fiduciary owes under this model would remain to the fund’s beneficiaries.26 In the absence of
other legislative means of recourse, this would make any legal recognition of the social and environmental
consequences of investment functionally unenforceable. The main advantage of a discretionary approach is
that it would enable fiduciaries to take pre-emptive measures to improve the environmental performance of

their investments rather than merely react to known costs or tangible risks.
Alternatively, legislation could enshrine procedures to improve the likelihood that fiduciaries would
consider the social and environmental impacts of their portfolios. Consideration of such impacts could still
be discretionary, but procedural reforms should make it more likely that fiduciaries would act
responsibly. Preferably, financiers should be obliged not only to disclose their SRI policies – as required in
some jurisdictions – but also their investment methodology and implementation efforts. Financiers’
disclosures on SRI could also be audited independently, and deficiencies publicly exposed. More
invasively, regulation could authorise outside stakeholders to have a voice in financial institutions’
governance, as representatives of particular social and environmental interests or constituencies, or at least to
require fiduciaries to consult with third parties. Already, the Equator Principles require signatory banks
to consult with local communities who may be affected by projects that they plan to finance.
One rationale for these reforms is that the governing boards of pension trusts, investment funds and banks
are typically drawn from a narrow segment of society. They commonly lack expertise on SRI issues and
do not adequately understand modern social and environmental challenges (Gribben and Gitsham, 2006).
Appropriately chosen representatives of key stakeholders could strengthen the ethical envelope of
investment. More representative governing boards may be better informed of the challenges of aligning
private investment with public responsibilities to ensure sustainability. They provide a means to
democratically diversify the range of perspectives that inform SRI policy and thereby bolster the
social legitimacy of ethical investment decisions. In several jurisdictions, legislative proposals have been
tabled to include stakeholder rights, including the UK’s Corporate Responsibility Bill and Australia’s Corporate
Code of Conduct Bill, albeit without success so far (McBeth, 2004).
Reshaping fiduciary duties by these ways is controversial (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). The

potential multitude of interests that a fiduciary would need to consider could unduly complicate
decision making (Jensen, 2000). Where a fiduciary must consider numerous conflicting interests without
any way of prioritising among them, any decision taken that is not blatantly self-interested possibly becomes
defensible. One solution would be to accommodate a voice for stakeholders in an external entity, such as
a national ethics council responsible. The state could appoint a body of representatives from key
constituencies to devise standards for ethical investment for sustainable development. Fiduciaries would
receive guidance on difficult ethical questions, avoiding trial and error. Sweden and Norway have
already established ethics councils to guide their public pension funds.
Further along the spectrum of possible reforms, fiduciaries could be obliged to act for sustainable
development or a similar general performance standard. The difficulty would be to design a performance
standard with sufficient clarity to make fiduciaries accountable. A vague duty ‘‘to promote
sustainability’’ would alone probably not work. Like the societal debates about sustainable development, such a
general goal would be subject to discretionary interpretations that would allow problematic tradeoffs and
perfunctory implementation. It would therefore need to be embellished with prophylactic rules.
Certainly, investing in an ostensibly lawful activity would not necessarily suffice. Commonly, no simple
distinction between a permissible and prohibited economic activity exists; typically, most corporate
activities or products are controlled, subject to impact assessments, permits and other regulatory
checks. And in some countries with rudimentary systems of environmental law, even an expressly
permissible activity may run afoul of elementary international sustainability standards.
Mandatory legislation for CSR in the context of company or financial regulation is not
unprecedented. Among sparse examples, the UK’s Companies Act of 2006 comes ‘‘close to a stakeholder
model of director’s duties’’, according to Williams and Conley (2007, p. 354). Section 172(1) of this
legislation requires the directors of a company in promoting the success of their firm to ‘‘have regard’’ to

‘‘the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the environment’’. Breach of this duty
could make a transaction voidable and result in civil liability for directors. Applied to financial
institutions, such a standard could help to redefine fiduciary duties of institutional investors along the lines
of Hawley and Williams’ (2000) ‘‘universal owner’’ thesis. The financial success of institutional investors,
with economy-wide portfolios, is unlikely to be insulated from the social and environmental stresses that a
single corporation may avoid.
Yet, this model has limitations. The profitability of the financial institution and, ultimately, its
beneficiaries, remains the overarching goal. Without other reforms, this construction of fiduciary duties
could jeopardise any inclination to invest sustainably. While universal owners may respond to the
externalities of individual companies that create costs elsewhere in the economy, universal owners may be
blind to the externalities of the market as a whole. Moreover, the tendency to delegate investment
management to specialist fund managers, with shortterm performance targets, coupled with reliance on
corporate valuation models that do not measure economic factors holistically, further undermines
universal sustainable investing. Additional reforms are required to align universal owners with ethical
investment.
For example, sustainability indicators could be prescribed by regulation to effectively set fiduciary
performance benchmarks, such as for the carbon footprint of a portfolio or other broad indicators
enabling a fuller view of environmental performance. By this approach, fiduciaries would not be
required to estimate and account for the social and environmental costs and benefits of investments.
Rather, they would need to ensure that their total investment portfolio adheres to prescribed
sustainability benchmarks by whatever means they choose. Its advantages are setting clear benchmarks
for financiers while avoiding prescribed methods for arriving at set results. Financial institutions that fail to
meet such standards could be subject to regulatory sanctions including future restrictions on their

investment choices or financial penalties to reflect social costs.
Thus, the fiduciary standard by this model would effectively emphasise the ‘‘returns’’ to society as a
whole. While the language of ‘‘returns’’ may sound too instrumental for ecological ethicists, it simply is one
way of articulating in the vocabulary of financial analysts the goals of maintaining and enhancing
ecological integrity. But, crucially, while investors could continue to be legally defined as the sole
beneficiaries of such fiduciary duties, diminishing sustainability would no longer be a permissible
means of obtaining financial gain. While some values and practices, particularly in areas such as human
rights, may defy simplification into sustainability indicators, supplementary means such as duties to
conduct social impact assessments and consult with affected stakeholders might assist. The next section
canvasses some options for additional reforms to promote ethical investment for sustainability.

Secondary reforms

To keep ethical investment ethical will require more from law-makers than redefined fiduciary obligations.
For example, in the retail investment market, mutual funds have much more flexibility in their investment
choices and conceivably can cater to any value that investors demand including those oppressive to
environmental considerations. In the banking sector, in most jurisdictions lenders do not owe depositors a
fiduciary duty, and banks have sometimes been implicated in financing environmentally controversial
projects (BankTrack, 2004). Therefore, other kinds of policy tools must be harnessed to capture the
diverse array of financial entities and transactions.
As a priority, reformers must seek to improve the quality of corporate environmental and social
reporting. Having companies report regularly and comprehensively on their environmental and social

activities and impacts can help greatly to generate reliable information to inform SRI choices (Harte et al.,
1991). Certainly, in the current investment climate, such information alone will not induce SRI if the
financial implications of corporate behaviour are not apparent to financiers. But, conversely, without
such information, financiers mandated to invest ethically would face enormous difficulties deciding
which firms represent ethical choices. Traditionally, corporate financial reporting has not reflected the
social and environmental costs and benefits of business activity. Securities regulation in the United States,
Canada and other major jurisdictions requires disclosure of financially material environmental costs, but
implementation of such requirements has been patchy (Government Accountability Office, 2004).
Alternatively, in some jurisdictions, separate corporate environmental reporting standards have been
legislated, such as in France, the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark, among various examples (KPMG,
2005).
Corporate governance must also be reformed. The importance of democratising governance within
financial institutions has already been canvassed. Comparable reforms at the corporate level are
necessary given that social investors sometimes rely on shareholder advocacy as a means of changing
recalcitrant firms from within. Shareholder resolutions sponsored by institutional investors are a seminal
means by which financiers can seek to influence company policy (Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999). In some
jurisdictions, significant barriers to shareholder activism persist, such as restrictions on the type of issues
that can be raised in a shareholder resolution and the passive culture of voting fostered by proxy contest
rules (Sarra, 2003). Among possible reforms beyond liberalising the use of shareholder resolutions,
investment institutions could be required to register their share votes, so as to encourage them to
formulate and express a view on all issues put to a vote at shareholder meetings. Another possibility is
the appointment of more minority-independent directors to corporate boards, nominated by various

stakeholder constituencies rather than by the firm’s management (Gilson and Kraakman, 1991, p. 870).
Economic instruments, such as pollution taxes and tradeable emission allowances, provide another area
for reform. They can attribute quantified negative and positive externalities to firms, for reflection in their
earnings, competitiveness and, ultimately, share prices and other financial indicators. This attribution,
in turn, should influence the allocation of capital, making polluters competitively disadvantaged. While SRI
regulation cannot rest only on a system of monetary incentives if it wishes to move beyond the business
case, it is one of the most politically viable reforms. Already, the Netherlands’ tax incentives for green
project investments have catalysed the Dutch SRI market, accounting for about half of its SRI
(Scholtens, 2005). Taxes can also reward long-term investment, such as by levying charges on short-term
gains from trading shares. While such measures can help strengthen the business case for SRI, they
can also help reduce resistance to ethical investment by negating the countervailing economic
incentives.
Another kind of economic instrument is created by liability rules, under which a company or even its
financial sponsor is responsible for the costs of pollution or other environmental damage. This can
illuminate the environmental impacts of investment more acutely to financial investors. Liability of
financiers could arise where an institutional shareholder was in a position to exert significant influence or
where a lender disregarded due diligence requirements for assessing a borrower’s environmental
safeguards. Such costs would ultimately affect the cost of finance. In the United States, lender liability
under the 1980 ‘‘Superfund’’ legislation for cleanup of contaminated lands had some sobering effects on
the behaviour of banks (Norton, 1995). However, financier liability has several drawbacks that limit its
contribution to SRI. Unlike environmental taxes, the liability model depends upon a well-resourced
plaintiff willing to challenge a polluter in court. Further, the complex evidential rules under which such law
suits must be proved, greatly hinder the chances of successful litigation. More fundamentally, tying

the liability of a bank or investment fund to the environmental harms of the firms that it finances
ignores the argument that sometimes financiers should be held to a higher standard of behaviour
given both their strategic environmental significance and the wider economic repercussions if they fail.
States must also get their own house in order. Public finance, such as public sector pension funds, can
be ‘‘a potentially powerful catalyst for change’’ towards sustainable development (Hess, 2007, p. 42). States
could mobilise public capital to address strategic social and environmental issues, as occurs to some extent in
the national pension plans of Scandinavia and France that are obliged to invest ethically and responsibly.
Through their central banks, states could also influence capital allocation by giving preferential treatment to
environmentally critical industries. In an international context, foreign aid and multilateral development
investments provide further contexts for SRI (Handl, 2001; Tarp, 2000). Public–private financing
partnerships, availed sometimes in multilateral finance, offer a novel way by which governments can guide
financial markets (French, 1998). Environmental-conditioned partnerships on preferential terms could
bridge the cost gap between what private financiers wish to commit and what is necessary for environmentally
sustainable investments.
Finally, among possible collateral reforms for SRI that are less tied to economic incentives and
self-interest, an international treaty setting social and environmental standards for global finance would be
beneficial. SRI governance can no longer hinge solely on national standards (Doering et al., 2002, p.
54). International level financial regulation would mitigate a deleterious race to the bottom, as common
standards should reduce the incentives for financiers to flee to the most regulatorily benign markets. The
existing panoply of voluntary international standards, such as the UNPRI or Equator Principles, lacks the
exacting standards required. An international treaty could prescribe a general fiduciary duty for
sustainability, clear sustainability performance standards and more robust procedural standards on public

disclosure and consultation. Certainly, this is not an easy path, for the fate of the UN Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations proposed in 2002 illustrates the obstacles that vested
interests would create to such a comprehensive challenge to the freedoms of global finance.

Conclusions

So far, SRI has had an evolutionary rather than revolutionary impact on financial markets. In its
traditional guise, SRI provides both a warning and an opportunity to the financial sector. It warns that
investment practices often impair ecological health and intensify social injustice. It also presents an
opportunity to reform those practices and thereby enable financiers to contribute to sustainability policy
goals. While the SRI market is flourishing, underlying practices remain largely unchanged; investors
may acknowledge environmental problems where they are financially material to the bottom line, but they
discreetly eschew deeper ethical issues. The business case model of SRI sanguinely transforms the tensions
between environmental protection and profitable investment into a harmonious relationship. Of course,
that environmental care and business success can be compatible is not deniable – financiers should benefit
from companies that reduce their ecological footprint.
The objection arises in how some financiers masquerading as responsible investors merely tinker
with unsustainable practices. Tethered to a philosophy of financial materiality, the business case may
address some environmental problems through improved research and analysis. However, it cannot
accommodate ecological issues not valued by the market, and existing strategies in this model are
unlikely to transform investment ‘‘value’’ to incorporate other non-financial factors. Without
demonstrated financial advantage, an investment analysis may advocate delaying or halting measures that

mitigate pollution, especially in the absence of effective government regulation and stakeholder
pressure. In fact, a countervailing business case for intensifying environmentally unsustainably practices will
be evaluated. Thus, despite the SRI industry’s rhetoric about climate change risks, the fossil fuel industry
has hardly changed as surging investment in Alberta’s oil sands lamentably shows (Makin, 2007). To keep
ethical investment ethical necessitates many changes to SRI regulation. The legal system is the midwife of
society, translating its values and expectations into workable policy instruments for implementation.
Among the menu of reforms, the reformulation of fiduciary duties is crucial. They define the core goals
and processes of decision making within financial institutions. Through fiduciary duties, the traditional
concept of ‘‘benefit’’ to investors can be ethically redefined, and thereby financiers steered towards
sustainability. If grounded in new forms of social accounting, sustainability indicators and performance
standards, such fiduciary standards could bring financiers much nearer to a system of ethical investment
that respects the environment. Legal reforms to improve the business case for SRI can help, but harnessing
economic self-interest must be a means to an end, not the end itself. To properly address the causes of
humankind’s unsustainable path, the financial sector like other economic sectors must function within
a broader ethical envelope that prioritises other values.

Notes
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See http://www.iccr.org/issues/globalwarm/goalsobjectives. php.

2

http://www.foe.org/camps/intl/declaration.html.

3

Remarks, Noel Purcell, Group General Manager, Westpac (UNEPFI Global Roundtable, Melbourne, 24– 25

October 2007).
4
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2001). No. 2001-152, arts. 21, 23.
5

Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), ‘‘Disclo-

sure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management Investment Companies’’
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274; Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA), National Instrument 81-106 Investment Fund Continuous Disclosure and
Companion Policy 81-106CP (CSA, 2005).
6

http://www.globalreporting.org.

7

http://www.cdproject.net.
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9
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10

http://www.equator-principles.com.

11

http://www.earthcharter.org.

12
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13

14

National Parks and Conservation Authority v. Board of State Lands (1993) 869 P.2d 909, 921 (S.C. Utah).
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S.L.T. 329, 334 (per Lord Murray).
15

Though, one possible reason why SRI funds tend not to underperform is that many do not hold investment

portfolios significantly different to the market generally.
16

See McCreight v. 146919 Canada Ltd [1991] O.J.
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17

Pension legislation often mandates priority to financial investment returns [e.g. US’s Employee Retirement Income

Security Act 1974, s. 404(a)(1)(D)].
18

[1985] 1 Ch. 270.

19

[1988] S.L.T. 329.

20
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21

[1985] 1 Ch. 270.

22

(1989) 317 Md. 72; 562 A.2d 720, 107.

23

Conn. Gen. Stat. (2002), s. 3-13d(a).

24

25

26

Trustee Act, S.M. 1995, s. 79.1.
Pension Benefits Amendment Act, S.M. 2005, s. 28.1(2.2).
[2004] 3 S.C.R. 461, 2004 S.C.C. 68, para. 43.
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